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THE ABORTION-FUNDING CASES AND 
POPULATION CONTROL: AN IMAGINARY 
LAWSUIT (AND SOME REFLECTIONS ON 
THE UNCERTAIN LIMITS OF 
REPRODUCTIVE PRIVACY) 
Susan Frelich Appleton* 
Betty Boe v. Abbot Abraham, President of the City Council of 
New Gotham, New Gotham State, et al. 
United States Court of Appeals, Special Circuit** 
June 20, 1979 
Before ADAMS, BAKER, CARSON, DANIEL, and EVERETT, 
Senior Circuit Judges. 
ADAMS, Senior Circuit Judge. 
Two issues are before us today: (I) the meaning of the term 
"medically necessary" in a public hospital's charter and (II) the 
constitutionality of state action that provides free medical treat-
ment to indigent pregnant women seeking an abortion but denies 
them such assistance for prenatal care and childbirth. On the 
basis of recent Supreme Court authority, we find that such action 
violates neither the hospital's charter nor the United States Con-
stitution. 
The city of New Gotham, a large and crowded metropolis, 
owns and operates one hospital, which, pursuant to its charter, 
provides "medically necessary services" free of charge for the 
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A. Greenfield, students at the Washington University School of Law, and the helpful 
comments on earlier drafts of this paper provided by Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Daniel Noyes 
Kirby Professor of Law, and Professors Jules B. Gerard, Patrick J. Kelley, and Ronald 
M. Levin of the Washington University School of Law. 
** The United States Court of Appeals, Special Circuit, last sat in 1965 in order to 
decide Jones & Smith v. Town of New Harmony. See Bittker, The Case of the Checker-
Board Ordinance: An Experiment in Race Relations, 71 YALE L.J. 1387 (1962). With 
Professor Bittker's permission and this author's acknowledged debt to his article, the same 
judges - now senior circuit judges eager to resolve another fictitious controversy - have 
reconvened to decide the instant case. Any apparent changes in judicial personalities or 
writing styles may be attributed to the passage of time and the annual succession of law 
clerks. 
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city's indigent residents.1 Alarmed by the recent dramatic in-
crease in New Gotham's population, particularly among the poor, 
and by the resulting drain on public services, 2 the City Council 
of New Gotham, whose members are duly elected by the city's 
residents, has enacted a number of measures designed to encour-
age population control, consistent with the campaign promises of 
several councilmen.3 Among these measures is a policy directive 
requiring the public hospital to cease providing all .medical ser-
vices related to prenatal care and childbirth. Instead, a physi-
cian on the hospital staff is to instruct every woman seeking med-
ical care there in connection with pregnancy that an abortion4 is 
available at any time throughout her pregnancy.5 
In accordance with a longstanding staffing practice, the doc-
tors and medical students at the public hospital's obstetrics-
gynecology clinic are drawn from the faculty and student body of 
the New Gotham Medical School, known nationwide for its work 
in population control and related fields; as a result, the medical 
1. The hospital is a municipal hospital established under the laws of New Gotham 
State and a city ordinance "for the reception of persons requiring relief during temporary 
sickness." As an "acute short term general hospital," it does not provide indefinite or 
custodial treatment. All residents of the city of New Gotham are entitled to in-patient 
admission for any surgical or other procedure which the hospital permits and for the 
performance of which it has the proper facilities. Although any city resident may have 
any such procedure or treatment performed at the hospital for a specified charge, under 
its charter the hospital is to provide all "medically necessary" services at no cost for those 
residents who meet the hospital's standards of indigency. Under these standards, an 
indigent person or family is one who falls below the federally defined poverty level. See 
45 C.F.R. §§ 1060.2-1, .2-2 (1978) (poverty income guidelines). For a description of a 
similar municipal hospital, see Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp., 475 F.2d 701 (1st Cir.), 
stay of mandamus denied, 411 U.S. 929 (1973). 
2. Though New Gotham is crowded in comparison to other urban areas of roughly 
the same size and in recent years has experienced fiscal difficulties, there is no evidence 
that either of these problems has approached an emergency condition. Instead, the princi-
pal concern is that the city has too many inhabitants to be able to provide the "quality 
of life" that a majority of its residents desire. 
3. The policy and practice at issue in this case constitute only part of a series of 
measures undertaken by New Gotham for the purpose of promoting population control. 
The city has, for example, also established throughout the metropolitan area a number 
of abortion clinics and family planning agencies operating independently of the public 
hospital. 
These measures were among those included in the "quality of life" platform espoused 
by all of the winning candidates for the City Council in the last municipal election. 
4. Neither the New Gotham policy directive nor the physicians on the hospital staff 
make a distinction between so-called "therapeutic" and "nontherapeutic" abortions; re-
gardless of any particular indigent woman's physical or emotional reaction to her preg-
nancy, termination is available as described. 
5. The legislature of New Gotham State, in which the city of New Gotham is located, 
also eager to encourage reduced reproduction, has repealed all criminal abortion statutes 
from the state's penal code, thus legalizing all abortions whenever performed. 
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personnel who are asked to comply with the policy directive 
strongly support its aims. 
Immediately before the filing of this lawsuit, plaintiff Betty 
Boe, an indigent resident of New Gotham, consulted a physician 
on the public hospital staff who informed her that she was ap-
proximately six weeks pregnant and that the hospital would pro-
yide her with an abortion free of charge at any time during her 
pregnancy. Boe proceeded unsuccessfully to seek free prenatal 
care at the public hospital. 8 Because she still wishes to receive 
prenatal care, to carry the pregnancy to term, and to give birth 
to the child, but lacks the financial wherewithal to do so, she 
brought this action alleging a violation of the hospital's charter 
and challenging the constitutionality of the policy directive and 
hospital staffing practice that together preclude her from ob-
taining the desired treatment free of charge.7 Following a trial to 
the court, the trial judge found for defendants and dismissed the 
complaint with prejudice; Boe appeals. 
I 
Boe first argues that the policy in question violates the public 
hospital's own charter, under which the hospital is to provide the 
indigent with all care that is "medically necessary."8 We disa-
gree.9 
6. All parties stipulate that during her initial visit to the hospital Boe was assured 
that her request for free childbirth and postpartum treatment would likewise be denied. 
At the time this appeal was argued, one month ago, Boe's attorney reported that she was 
beginning the seventh month of her pregnancy, that she still desired to deliver rather than 
abort, that she met the hospital's standards ofindigency, that she remained unable to pay 
for the desired services herself, and that she had not found any alternative means for 
obtaining such medical treatment without cost. On the basis of these undisputed facts, 
there is no question that this lawsuit satisfies the case or controversy requirement of article 
ill of the Constitution. • 
7. Boe filed this civil rights action, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situ-
ated, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) and 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1976). Her complaint named 
as defendants Abbot Abraham, the presiding member of the City Council of New Gotham, 
as well as the other members of the Council, and Dr. Clyde Carver, the Director of the 
Department of Health and Hospitals and Hospital Commissioner of New Gotham 
[hereinafter referred to collectively as "New Gotham" or "the city"]. Boe sought, in the 
words of her complaint, declaratory and injunctive relief against "the existence, applica-
tion, implementation, and enforcement of express and implied policies, rules, regulations, 
procedures, and practices barring, thwarting, limiting, and infringing the provision by the 
public hospital of New Gotham of free medical treatment related to prenatal care and 
childbirth for the indigent residents of the city." For a similarly worded complaint, see 
Doe v. Poelker, 515 F.2d 541 (8th Cir. 1975), revd. per curiam, 432 U.S. 519 (1977). 
8. See note 1 supra. 
9. By itself, the construction of the ~ospital's charter would not present a federal 
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The United States Supreme Court recently confronted a re-
lated issue in Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977), where it was asked 
to construe Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 10 which requires 
states participating in its federally funded medical assistance 
program for needy persons to formulate "reasonable standards" 
for determining the extent of assistance to be provided, consistent 
with the objectives of the Act. 11 Pursuant to this requirement, 
Pennsylvania had adopted regulations allowing such assistance 
for abortions only where certified by physicians to be "medically 
· necessary."12 Elective or nontherapeutic abortions were thus ex-
cluded from coverage. A majority of the Court found the regula-
tions to be within the broad discretion accorded to the states by 
the Act, reasoning that "it is hardly inconsistent with the objec-
tives of the Act for a State to refuse to fund unnecessary -
though perhaps desirable - medical services." 432 U.S. at 444-
45 (emphasis in original). 
Dissenting, Mr. Justice Brennan pointed out that an implicit 
corollary of the majority's analysis was that medical services for 
childbirth would likewise fall outside the scope of "medically 
necessary" treatment if the state were to provide nontherapeutic 
abortions for its needy women. 432 U.S. at 451-52. 13 He reasoned 
that "[p]regnancy is unquestionably a condition requiring medi-
question appropriate for our consideration. We nonetheless have pendent jurisdiction to 
decide the question, because of the close relationship between this issue and plaintiffs 
federal constitutional challenge. UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). In view of the strong 
policy disfavoring the unnecessary resolution of constitutional questions, we address it 
first, as did the district court below. See Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 546-47 (1974). 
See also Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp., 341 F. Supp. 1385, 1388 app. (D. Mass. 1972), 
revd. on other grounds, 475 F.2d 701 (1st Cir.), stay of mandamus denied, 411 U.S. 929 
(1973). In addition, because of the continuing progression of plaintiffs pregnancy and the 
consequent need to resolve this case as expeditiously as possible, we decline to exercise 
our discretionary authority to abstain until a state court construction of the charter is 
available. See also Zbaraz v. Quern, 572 F.2d 582, 587 (7th Cir. 1978); Hathaway v. 
Worcester City Hosp., 475 F.2d at 705. 
10. Title XIX of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396k (1976 & Supp. I 
1977), establishes the Medicaid program under which participating states may provide 
federally funded medical assistance to needy persons. See 432 U.S. at 440. 
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (1976). 
12. See 432 U.S. at 441-42 n.3. The purpose of the federal statute is to "[enable] 
each State, as far as practicable under the conditions in such State, to furnish . . . medi-
cal assistance on behalf of [those] whose income and resources are insufficient to meet 
the costs of necessary medical services." 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1976) (emphasis added). See 
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(C)(i) (1976). 
13. Mr. Justice Brennan stated that, under the Court's analysis, "therapeutic" abor-
tions, like care accompanying live births, would also not constitute "necessary medical 
services" if elective abortions were available. 432 U.S. at 451-52 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
Using this logic, prenatal care would be "unnecessary" under similar circumstances. 
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cal services . . Treatment for the condition may involve medi-
cal procedures for its termination, or medical procedures to bring 
the pregnancy to term, resulting in a live birth." 432 U.S. at 449. 
Given the two mutually exclusive alternatives for responding to 
pregnancy, 14 it is clear that Mr. Justice Brennan is correct: the 
availability of one kind of medical procedure - in the instant 
case, abortion - necessarily renders the other - childbirth -
unneeded. 
Relying upon a line of reasoning employed by a majority of 
the United States Supreme Court and the elaboration of that 
reasoning offered by Mr. Justice Brennan, we therefore conclude 
that the implementation of the challenged policy directive by the 
New Gotham public hospital does not contravene that hospital's 
obligation under its charter to provide at no cost to the indigent 
all treatment that is "medically necessary." 
II 
Boe's complaint also raises questions of the right of privacy, 16 
due process of law, 16 and equal protection.17 Relying on Griswold 
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 
U.S. 438 (1972), she claims first that the ninth amendment's 
reservation of rights to the people18 shields from state intrusion 
14. "'[A]bortion and childbirth, when stripped of the sensitive moral arguments 
surrounding the abortion controversy, are simply two alternative medical methods of 
dealing with pregnancy ... .'" 432 U.S. at 449 (quoting Roe v. Norton, 408 F. Supp, 
660, 663 n.3 (D. Conn. 1975), revd. sub nom. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977)), 
15. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Serva. Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977); Whalen 
v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 60 
(1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 
485-86 (1965). See generally Dixon, The Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional Charter for 
an Expanded Law of Privacy?, 64 MICH. L. REv. 197 (1965); Henkin, Privacy and 
Autonomy, 74 CoLUM. L. REv. 1410 (1974); McKay, The Right of Privacy: Emanations 
and Intimations, 64 MICH. L. REV. 259 (1965); Silver, The Future of Constitutional 
Privacy, 21 ST. Loms U. L.J. 211 (1977). 
16. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Serva. Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977); Cleveland 
Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-63 
(1973); Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term - Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles 
in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1973). See also Moore v. City 
of East Cleveland; 431 U.S. 494, 500-04 (1977) (plurality opinion). 
17. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973). 
See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446-47 (1972); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 
535, 541-43 (1942). 
18. See Stanleyv. Illinois, 405 U.S. 646,651 (1972); Griswold~- Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479, 488-93 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 1131 163 
(1973). 
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her "decision whether to bear or beget a child." 19 She asserts 
further that a similar right of privacy, rooted in the fourteenth 
amendment's protection of personal liberty and explicitly recog-
nized by.the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 
(1973),20 renders unconstitutional New Gotham's action, which, 
she argues, injects the government impermissibly into a private 
realm of decision.21 Finally, Boe contends that the policy directive 
and staffing practice of the public hospital create a suspect classi-
fication, distinguishing indigent women seeking to abort from 
those seeking to carry their pregnancies to term, 22 that jeopardizes 
her fundamental right to procreate;23 because Boe claims that 
defendant officials of New Gotham have failed to demonstrate 
any compelling state interest or emergency situation justifying 
the policy in question, she alleges a violation of the fourteenth 
amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the laws. 24 
Although the general constitutional principles that Boe in-
vokes may be correct in the abstract, as current opinions of the 
United States Supreme Court demonstrate,25 they do not invali-
date the official action she challenges here, for they do not control 
19. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). The Court used similar language 
in Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977). 
20. See note 16 supra. 
21. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 & n.24, 600 & n.26 (1977); Tribe, supra note 
16, at 11; Comment, A Taxonomy of Privacy: Repose, Sanctuary and Intimate Decision, 
64 CALIF. L. REV. 1447, 1466-69 (1976). 
22. See also Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
23. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). She also claims that the city 
invidiously discriminates between nonindigent women who can afford to purchase medical 
care for childbirth and indigent women who cannot. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 
371 (1971); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 
(1956). 
24. If Boe successfully shows that the challenged policy either establishes a suspect 
classification or infringes a fundamental right, then she is entitled to invoke the standards 
of a mode of equal protection review described as "strict" judicial scrutiny. See, e.g., San 
Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973); Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214, 215 (1944). Such analysis shifts the burden of proof from the party 
challenging the classification and requires the party seeking to uphold it to demonstrate 
that it is necessary to further a compelling state interest and that there are available no 
less onerous alternatives for achieving that objective. 411 U.S. at 16-17. See also Gunther, 
The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a 
' Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1972); 
Developments in the Law - Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065, 1087-131 (1969). 
The compelling state interest test is likewise applied outside the equal protection 
context in cases where protected rights or liberties are infringed by state action that does 
not necessarily classify at all. E.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 686 
(1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154-56 (1973). See also 410 U.S. at 173 (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
25. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470-71 (1977) (equal protection); Carey v. Popu-
lation Serva. Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977) (privacy and due process). 
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on the facts of this particular case. We base our conclusion on the 
holdings, language, and reasoning employed by the Supreme 
Court in its recent decisions in Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977), 
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), and Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 
519 (1977). 
The facts of those cases are not complex and make clear their 
pertinence to the controversy before us: 
In Beal, which we summarized above, 26 a majority of the 
Court, reasoning that elective abortions are not "medically neces-
sary," found no violation of the Social Security Act in Pennsyl-
vania's refusal to extend Medicaid coverage to nontherapeutic 
abortions. In reaching that conclusion, the Court emphasized 
that, even though under Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), gov-
ernmental interests favoring childbirth are not sufficiently 
compelling before fetal viability27 to justify a proscription of 
abortions, such interests are of adequate legitimacy and force 
throughout pregnancy to support state action designed to encour-
age a woman to carry to term. 432 U.S. at 445-46. 
The Court developed t1iat reasoning further in two other 
cases decided the same day. In Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), 
a majority of the Court28 ruled that the statutory interpretation 
announced in Beal does not violate the Constitution and that, 
therefore, states participating in the Medicaid program estab-
lished by Title XIX of the Social Security Act are not constitu-
tionally compelled to finance nontherapeutic abortions when they 
choose to pay medical expenses for childbirth. The Court thus 
rejected the contention that such an allocation of public funds 
violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment 
by discriminating against those indigent women who choose to 
exercise the constitutional right to abort instead of carrying their 
pregnancies to term.29 Expanding upon the analysis employed in 
26. See text at notes 10-14 supra. 
27. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-65 (1973). The Court in Roe defined a viable fetus 
as one "potentially able to live outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid." 410 
U.S. at 160. 
28. In Beal and Maher, Justice Powell wrote opinions for a majority composed of 
himself, Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Stewart, White, Rehnquist, end Stevens. 
Chief Justice Burger, though joining in the majority opinion in Maher, submitted a 
separate concurrence in that case. 432 U.S. at 481. The main opinion in Poelker v. Doe 
was published as a per curiam for the same six members of the Court. 
The dissenters in all three cases - Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun -
filed a number of separate opinions. 432 U.S. at 448 (Brennan, J.); 432 U.S. at 454 
(Marshell, J.); 432 U.S. at 462 (Blackmun, J.); 432 U.S. at 482 (Brennan, J.); 432 U.S. 
at 522 (Brennan, J.). 
29. Plaintiffs in Maher had argued that, under Roe v. Wade, states are required to 
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Beal, the majority explained that, although Roe v. Wade and its 
progeny may foreclose a state from creating an "absolute obsta-
cle"30 to abortion, particularly during the first trimester, those 
cases do not inhibit the democratic31 adoption of policies and 
practices favoring one response to the condition of pregnancy, 
childbirth, over the alternative, abortion. 32 
Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977), the third case decided 
that day, applied the constitutional principle articulated in 
Maher to validate both a policy directive of Mayor John Poelker 
of St. Louis, Missouri, 33 and a staffing practice of one of St. 
Louis's city-owned hospitals34 that together operated to prohibit 
nontherapeutic abortions in that public facility.35 While observ-
ing that the mayor's personal opposition to abortion was legally 
irrelevant, the Supreme Court found significant the St. Louis 
voters' approval of policies preferring childbirth to abortion, ex-
accord equal treatment to both abortion and childbirth. 432 U.S. at 470. 
30. 432 U.S. at 473 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 70-71 n.11 
(1976) (emphasis deleted)). 
31. 432 U.S. at 480. 
32. The Court emphasized the distinction between an "absolute obstacle," see note 
30 supra, or "unduly burdensome interference with [the] freedom to decide whether to 
terminate [a] pregnancy," 432 U.S. at 474, on the one hand, and an official "value 
judgment," 432 U.S. at 474, "state encouragement,'' 432 U.S. at 475, or "policy choice,'' 
432 U.S. at 477, favoring childbirth, on the other. While the former (which includes 
criminal penalties !llld withdrawals of all welfare benefits to those exercising the right in 
question, 432 U.S. at 474 n.8) must be justified by a compelling state interest, see 432 
U.S. at 475-76, the latter (which includes refusals to subsidize the protected activity, 432 
U.S. at 474 n.8) needs only to be rational in order to pass constitutional muster, 432 
U.S. at 478. In developing this contrast, the Court noted by analogy that, even though 
parents have a constitutionally protected right to choose to educate their children in 
private schools, a state may nonetheless encourage the selection of public school education 
by making it the more attractive alternative through state funding. 432 U.S. at 476-77. 
Similarly, the Court contrasted penalties on the exercise of a constitutional right, e.g., 
the right to travel interstate, with failure to subsidize that right for the indigent, e.g., the 
failure to provide free bus fares. 432 U.S. at 474-75 n.8. While the Constitution may 
prohibit the former, it does not require the latter. 432 U.S. at 474-75 n.8. See also D--
R._ v. Mitchell, 456 F. Supp. 609 (D. Utah 1978). The Court has continued to employ 
the "undue burden" language in subsequent analysis. See Bellotti v. Baird, 99 S. Ct. 
3035, 3046, 3050, 3051 (1979) (plurality opinion). 
33. The directive barred the performance of all abortions in the public hospitals 
absent a threat of grave physiological injury or death to the mother. 432 U.S. at 520. 
34. For several years, the obstetrics-gynecology clinic at the city hospital in question 
had drawn its staff from the faculty and students at the St. Louis University School of 
Medicine, a Jesuit-operated institution opposed to abortion. 432 U.S. at 520. 
35. In Poetker, plaintiffs challenge to the policy directive and staffing practice had 
been "cast •.. in an equal protection mold," 432 U.S. at 520, by the court below, which 
had struck down this official action as invidious discrimination against women who cannot 
afford to obtain abortions at private hospitals, as distinguished from those who can. 432 
U.S. at 520. 
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pressed in their election of Poelker. 432 U.S. at 521. Whatever the 
right acknowledged in Roe v. Wade, the Court found no constitu-
tional violation in a city's implementation of the policy choices 
of its electorate, even if such choices might, as a practical matter, 
hinder the exercise of that right. 38 
Although the precise issues before the Court in those cases, 
the abortion-funding cases, are the mirror image of those pre-
sented here, we think the broad governmental discretion ap-
proved in Beal, Maher, and Poelker amply supports the value 
judgments reflected in the New Gotham public hospital directive 
and staffing practice. In those cases, the majority's repeated affir-
mation of the constitutional validity of a state or local govern-
ment's expression and implementation of policy preferences fa-
voring childbirth37 intimates that official policy preferences for 
precisely the opposite goal would be equally acceptable, at least 
from a constitutional perspective.38 Thus, when the Supreme 
Court notes that governmental concerns falling short of compel-
ling state interests afford sufficient constitutional support for re-
fusal to provide abortions at public expense, 39 it suggests that 
less-than-overriding governmental concerns would likewise jus-
tify excluding treatment for prenatal care and childbirth from 
welfare coverage40 - precisely the path chosen by New Gotham. 
Similarly, when the Court explains that official value judg-
ments fostering childbirth are appropriately determined on a 
democratic basis,41 it authorizes an electorate to favor an alloca-
tion of public funds that promotes abortion instead. Surely, if 
voters are to have a choice, the courts must allow them to con-
sider the available alternatives. Here, the collective will of the 
36. The Court stressed that Mayor Poelker "is an elected official responsible to the 
people of St. Louis," 432 U.S. at 521, whose "policy of denying city funds for 
[nontherapeutic] abortions •.• is subject to public debate and approval or disapproval 
at the polls." 432 U.S. at 521. 
37. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 474-77; Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. at 521. See also 
Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. at 445-46. 
38. Nowhere in the abortion-funding cases does the majority limit its reasoning to 
policy preferences favoring childbirth; it simply presents a series of broad and general 
reasons for upholding types of state action that, in those cases, happen to favor the value 
of childbirth. The analysis used is sufficiently open-ended to control in a situation in 
which abortion ,is selected as the preferred value instead. See Bolner & Jacobsen, The 
Right to Procreate: The Dilemma of Overpopulation and the United States Judiciary, 25 
LOY. L. REV. 235, 254-55 (1979). 
39. E.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 477. 
40. See note 38 supra. 
41. See, e.g., Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. at 447-48 n. 15; Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 480; 
Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. at 521. 
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residents of New Gotham is apparent from their election to the 
City Council of candidates advocating population control. 42 Par-
ticularly pertinent here is the Court's specific observation in 
Maher that one sort of reason that might prompt valid state 
action deviating from "a position of neutrality between abortion 
and childbirth" would be "legitimate demographic concerns." 
432 U.S. at 478 n.11. Such language is certainly broad enough to 
encompass New Gotham's very real concerns regarding the size 
of its population and its resulting efforts to limit procreation. 43 
In short, even if we concede that Boe and others similarly 
situated have a fundamental right, secured by the fourteenth 
amendment and embraced within the constitutionally protected 
zone of privacy, to decide whether to ~arry their pregnancies to 
term or to abort,44 and even if, as we assume, New Gotham's 
interest in curbing population growth is not of a "compelling" 
character, 45 still we find no constitutional violation. Like the state 
action challenged in Beal, Maher, and Poelker, the actions of the 
defendants here do not obstruct absolutely or burden unduly the 
exercise of the asserted right.46 Notwithstanding the policy direc-
tive and staffing practice of the public hospital, Boe may still 
obtain the medical treatment she seeks. The city's policy prefer-
ences do not compel her to terminate her pregnancy now or at any 
other time. To paraphrase the language of the Supreme Court, 
[t]he State may have made [abortion] a more attractive alterna-
tive, thereby influencing the woman's decision, but it has imposed 
no restriction on access to [childbirth] that was not already there. 
The indigency that may make it difficult - and in some cases, 
perhaps, impossible -for some women to [carry their pregnancies 
to term and deliver their children] is neither created nor in any 
way affected by the [city's] regulation. 
42. See text at note 3 supra. 
43. The demographic concerns in Maher were not so clearly apparent; the majority 
in that case never explained whether or not a desire to combat undefPopulation was, in 
fact, responsible for Connecticut's policy preference favoring childbirth. But see 432 U.S. 
at 489 n.* (Brennan, J., dissenting). Cf. Young Women's Christian Assn. v. Kugler, 342 
F. Supp. 1048, 1074 (D.N.J. 1972) (pre-Roe abortion bar successfully challenged; court 
rejects state's purported interest in fostering population growth "especially in a densely 
populated and heavily urbanized state like New Jersey, with its attendant demographic, 
economic, sociological and ecological problems"). 
44. See notes 19-21 supra and accompanying text. 
45. See note 2 supra. New Gotham, though emphasizing the importance of its con-
cerns regarding overpopulation, has conceded that its interests are not now of the same 
magnitude as those that have been adjudged "compelling" under the fourteenth amend-
ment. See Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 314 (1978) (Powell, J.); 
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
46. See note 32 supra. 
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Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 474. There is no controlling authority, 
moreover, for the proposition suggested by Boe that her indigency 
somehow places her within a "suspect class."47 As the Supreme 
Court has observed, it has never held that "financial need alone 
identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analy-
sis." 432 U.S. at 471. 
Of course, even though a state may have considerably 
broader power to encourage actions deemed to be in the public 
interest than it does to interfere directly with protected activity, 48 
we must still determine whether the official action challenged 
here satisfies "the less demanding test of rationality that applies 
in the absence of a suspect classification or the impingement of 
a fundamental right." 432 U.S. at 478.49 We conclude that New 
Gotham has met that test. 
First, as we noted earlier, "legitimate demographic concerns 
about [a state's or city's] rate of population growth" are suffi-
cient to support governmental "departure from a position of neu-
trality between abortion and childbirth." 432 U.S. at 478 rt.ll.6u 
The parties have stipulated that there has been a recent increase, 
albeit one short of crisis proportions, in the population of New 
Gotham; the voters' election to the City Council of candidates 
who campaigned on platforms of population control demonstrates 
public aware·ness of this phenomenon and public desire to miti-
gate this trend. 51 
Nor is the policy in question irrational as it relates to the 
health of New Gotham's pregnant residents. As the Supreme 
Court pointed out several years ago, abortions during early preg-
nancy by competent licensed physicians are now "relatively safe" 
and the risks to women undergoing such abortions "appear to be 
as low as or lower than ... for normal childbirth." Roe u. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113, 149 (1973).52 Even with respect to abortions per-
formed after the first trimester, the maternal mortality rate in 
47. See notes 22-24 supra and accompanying text. 
48. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 476 (1977). 
49. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970). 
50. See also Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-500 (1977) (plurality 
opinion) (preventing overcrowding, minimizing traffic and parking congestion, and avoid-
ing undue financial burden on city's schools are legitimate goals); Village of Belle Terre 
v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (land-use restrictions designed to promote quiet, family 
values, and clean air are legitimate). 
51. See note 3 supra and accompanying text. 
52. Though New Gotham provides free abortions in later pregnancy as well, see note 
5 supra and accompanying text, any woman choosing to abort may obtain such treatment 
as early during her pregnancy as she wishes. 
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childbirth exceeds the maternal mortality rate from abortions. 
See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 77 (1976). 
Similarly, New Gotham's bona fide financial concerns make 
this policy a reasonable one. As Mr. Justice Blackmun has ob-
served, "the cost of a nontherapeutic abortion is far less than the 
cost of maternity care and delivery, and holds no comparison 
whatsoever with the welfare costs that will burden the State for 
the new indigents and their support in the long, long years 
ahead." Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 463 (1977) (Blackmun, J., 
dissenting). 53 
For these reasons, we reject Boe's constitutional challenges 
to the manner in which New Gotham has chosen to operate its 
public hospital. 
Judges BAKER and CARSON concur; Judge DANIEL con-
curs in an opinion to be filed at a later time. 
EVERET!', Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting. 
I respectfully dissent. 
I 
I would find the policy directive inconsistent with the hospi-
tal's charter. Prenatal care and medical services incident to child-
birth are "medically necessary" because, in today's world, that 
happens to be the way pregnancies are treated. That is not to say, 
as Justice Brennan implies in Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 449-52 
(1977), that pregnancy is a disease or that prenatal care and de-
livery are among the "cures" therefor;1 it is simply to point out a 
53. See Zbaraz v. Quern, 469 F. Supp.1212, 1218 & n.8 (N.D. Ill.) (comparative costs 
of state-funded abortion and state-funded childbirth), probable jurisdiction noted sub 
nom. Williams v. Zbaraz, 100 S. Ct. 447 (1979). But see Hardy, Privacy and Public Fund-
ing: Maher v. Roe as the Interaction of Roe v. Wade and Dandridge v. Williams, 18 ARiz. 
L. REv. 903, 927-32 (1976). 
• •••••••••• 
1. The reasoning used by Justice Brennan in dissent in Beal and relied upon by the 
majority in this case is unsound. Abortions performed to terminate pregnancies that 
jeopardize a woman's life or health are clearly distinguishable from other abortions. Given 
that distinction, the Beal majority's interpretation of "medically necessary" cannot be 
reduced to the absurdity that Justice Brennan asserts; where a pregnancy does not present 
risks to life or health, an aoortion is no different from any other elective, nonnecessary 
medical procedure, unless, of course, pregnancy itself is to be considered a disease that 
must be "cured" in every case by some sort of medical treatment. Although there appears 
to be no universally accepted definition of "disease," see generally The Concept of Health, 
1 THE HASTINGS CENTER STUDIES No. 3, 1973, there is substantial authority for excluding 
pregnancy from the reach of that term, whatever the precise boundaries of its meaning. 
See, e.g., Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367, 375 (E.D. Va. 1974) ("pregnancy 
is not a disease, as that term is commonly understood"), affd., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 
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fact of American life in this decade. 2 "The pregnancy of the 
mother, absent miscarriage, inevitably and biologically termi-
nates in the birth of the child, a process which today at least 
requires medical attention and assistance." Roe v. Norton, 522 
F.2d 928, 941 (2d Cir.) (Mulligan, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part), on remand, 408 F. Supp. 660 (D. Conn. 1975), 
revd. sub nom. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). The availabil-
ity of free abortions for indigent women does not alter this general 
fact although, for any given woman who elects to interrupt the 
natural biological course of her pregnancy by abortion, childbirth 
will not occur. But such cases tell us nothing about medical ne-
cessity in general, nor do they provide a meaningful basis for 
analyzing those situations in which no abortion is performed.3 
1975), revd. on other grounds, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 500 
n.4 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (pregnancy is a physiological process causing o vari-
able degree of disability on an individual basis); Cleveland Bd. of Educ, v. LoFleur, 414 
U.S. 632, 652 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) ("pregnancy is a normal biological func-
tion"); T. STEDMAN, STEDMAN's MEDICAL DICTIONARY, 401, 1134 (4th Unabr. Lawyers' ed. 
1976) (defining "disease" as "[m]orbus; illness; sickness; an interruption, cessation, or 
disorder of body functions, systems, or organs" but defining "pregnancy" as "[g]estation; 
fetation; cyesis; cyophoria; graviditas; gravidity; the state of a female after conception 
until the birth of the baby"). And just as pregnancy itself is not a disease, childbirth, the 
would-be "alternative" to abortion, is not "treatment" for pregnancy. See, e.g., id. at 
1473 ("treatment" defined as "[t]herapeutics; therapy; the medical or surgical core of o 
patient; the institution of measures or the giving ofremedies designed to cure a disease"). 
Though childbirth restores a pregnant woman to a nonpregnant state and though, today, 
it is always accompanied by medical attention and assistance, see note 2 infra, it is not 
in itself a medical procedure at all but rather the inevitable and biological end of a 
pregnancy in which no abortion, spontaneous or induced, has occurred. In short, child-
birth simply "happens," whether a doctor is present or not. See Klein v. Nassau County 
Medical Center, 347 F. Supp. 496,500 (E.D.N.Y.1972), vacated and remanded, 412 U.S. 
925 (1973). 
See generally Chalmers, Implications of the Current Debate on Obstetric Practice, 
in THE PLACE OF BIRTH 44, 47-48 (1978); Antler & Fox, The Movement Toward a Safe 
Maternity: Physician Accountability in New York City, 1915-1940, 50 BuLL. H!sT. MED. 
569, 571-72 (1976). 
2. Periodic medical attention throughout pregnancy and during and immediately 
following childbirth is now accepted practice and has contributed significantly to the 
decreased maternal and infant mortality rate in this country. See A. GUITMACHER, PRE0· 
NANCY, BmTH, AND FAMILY PLANNING 86-89, 335 (1973); Obstetrical Practices in the United 
States: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health and Scientific Research of the Senate 
Comm. on Human Resources, 95th Cong., 2d Seas. 36-37 (1978) (statement of Donald 
Kennedy). See generally Antler & Fox, supra note 1, at 592-94. Today, the children of98% 
of American women are delivered in hospitals. See BOSTON WOMEN'S HEALTH BooK 
COLLECTIVE, OUR BooIES, OUR SELVES 250 (2d ed. 1976). 
See also Klein v. Nassau County Medical Center, 347 F. Supp. 496, 500 (E,D.N,Y, 
1972), vacated and remanded, 412 U.S. 925 (1973); Roe v. Ferguson, 389 F, Supp, 387, 
392 (S.D. Ohio 1974), revd. on other grounds, 515 F.2d 279 (6th Cir. 1975). 
3. In any event, whether or not any particular medical procedure is "necessary" in a 
given case is a determination to be made by a physician, not by any general hospital 
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II 
A more serious problem is the majority's decision to uphold 
official action that, to me, is clearly ~nconstitutional. 
Though undoubtedly the States are and should be left free to 
reflect a wide variety of policies, and should be allowed broad 
scope in experimenting with various means of promoting those 
policies, ... "[t]here are limits to the extent to which a legisla-
tively represented majority may conduct . . . experiments at the 
expense of the dignity and personality" of the individual . . . . In 
this instance these limits are, in my view, reached and pa!3sed. 
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 555 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U._S. 535, 546 (1942) (Jackson, 
J., concurring)). 
Were I writing on a clean slate, it would, I believe, suffice for 
me to point out that "the right of procreation without state inter-
ference has long been recognized as 'one of the basic civil rights 
of man . . . fundamental to the very existence and survival of the 
race.'" Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 472 n.7 (1977) (quoting 
Skinner u. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).4 New Gotham 
has unquestionably interfered with that right by denying to poor 
women free medical care for prenatal treatment and childbirth 
while providing free abortions, all in the absence of any compel-
ling governmental interest. 5 
policy. See also, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192, 197 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 
113, 163 (1973); Roe v. Casey, 464 F. Supp. 487, 500 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Jaffe v. Sharp, 463 
F. Supp. 222, 228 (D. Mass. 1978), affd. sub nam. Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, 591 F.2d 121 
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 952 (1979). See generally Wood & Durham, Counseling, 
Consulting and Consent: Abortion and the Doctor-Patieht Relationship, 4 B.Y.U. L. REv. 
783 (1978). 
Finally, we should accept plaintiff's construction of the hospital charter in order to 
avoid the constitutional difficulties examined in Part II of this opinion. See also, e.g., 
United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1972) (plurality opinion). 
4. See also, e.g., Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (parent-child relation-
ship constitutionally protected); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality 
& Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 843-44 (1977) (importance of biological relationship in defining 
"family" for purposes of due process analysis); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 
494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion) (Constitution "protects the sanctity of the family"); 
Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) (privacy, protected by substantive aspects of 
fourteenth amendment but limited to those rights deemed "fundamental" or "implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty," encompasses matters relating to, inter alia, procreation); 
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639-40 (1974) ("freedom of personal 
choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 
(1972) (essential right to conceive and raise one's children); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 
U.S. 168, 166 (1944) (private realm of family life which state cannot enter); Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (liberty guaranteed by fourteenth amendment includes 
right to "establish a home and bring up children"). 
6. New Gotham has not maintained that its "overpopulation" has reached crisis 
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To validate such interference on the theory that it is a mere 
policy preference that satisfies the rational basis test is - as Mr. 
Justice Marshall observed in dissent in Beal, Maher, and Poelker 
- to employ a constitutional analysis "pull[ed] from thin air." 
432 U.S. at 457. Indeed, only eleven days before the decisions in 
Beal, Maher, and Poelker were handed down, a majority of the 
Court explicitly stated that, even in the absence of an "absolute 
obstacle," the compelling state interest test is the proper stan-
dard for assessing the constitutionality of governmental action 
that implicates the right of privacy by limiting an individual's 
access to the means necessary for the exercise of that right. 0 As a 
practical matter for the indigent, moreover, no interference with 
proportions or that its aim of improving the :'quality of life" of its citizens is compelling. 
See majority opinion notes 2 & 45 supra and accompanying text. Nor has the city sought 
to establish that the persons whose reproduction might be decreased by this policy are 
genetically defective. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). Much of the literature exam-
ining the constitutionality of programs of population control has concluded that, as bur-
dens on the right to procreate, such programs must advance a compelling state interest. 
See, e.g., Gray, Compulsory Sterilization in a Free Society: Choices and Dilemmas, 41 
U. CIN. L. REV. 529, 547-48, 571-85 (1972); Kindregan, State Power Over Human Fertility 
and Individual Liberty, 23 HAsTINGS L.J. 1401, 1422-23 (1972); Montgomery, The Popula-
tion Explosion and United States Law, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 629, 653-59 (1971); Rabin, 
Population Control Through Financial Incentives, 23 HAsTINGS L.J. 1353, 1386 (1972); 
Comment, Population Control: The Legal Approach to a Biological Imperative, 58 CALIF. 
L. REv. 1414, 1431-43 (1970); Note, Legal Analysis and Population Control: The Problem 
of Coercion, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1856, 1880-82 (1971); Comment, Population: The Problem, 
the Constitution and a Proposal, 11 J. FAM. L. 319, 332 (1971). The compelling state 
interest test has likewise been invoked in analyses of programs designed to promote eu-
genic goals through restrictions on procreation by certain individuals or groups. See, e.g., 
Friedman, Legal Implications of Amniocentesis, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 92, 135 (1974); Shaw, 
Procreation and the Population Problem, 55 N.C. L. REV. 1165, 1166 (1977); Vukowich, 
The Dawning of the Braue New World - Legal, Ethical, and Social Issues of Eugenics, 
1971 U. ILL. L.F. 189, 207-09; Waltz & Thigpen, Genetic Screening and Counseling: The 
Legal and Ethical Issues, 68 Nw. U. L. REV. 696, 721-26 (1973). 
6. In Carey v. Population Serva. Intl., 431 U.S. 678 (1977), where a New York statute 
restricting the distribution of contraceptives was found unconstitutional, a majority of the 
Justices observed: 
The significance of these cases [Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 
(1976); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973)] is that they establish that the same 
test must be applied to state regulations that burden an individual's right to decide 
to prevent conception or terminate a pregnancy by substantially limiting access to 
tfie means of effectuating that decision as is applied to state statutes that prohibit 
the decision entirely. Both types of regulation "may be justified only by a 
'compelling state interest' •.. and ••. must be narrowly drawn to express only 
the legitimate state interests at stake." 
431 U.S. at 688 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973)), 
Only Justice Powell, in an opinion not joined by any other member of the Court, 
suggested that some less exacting standard of review applies where the state action impli-
cates the right of privacy but does not "entirely frustrate[ ] or heavily burden[ ]" its 
exercise. 431 U.S. at 705 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
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individual freedom of choice regarding whether or not "to beget 
or bear a child"7 could be more "absolute"8 than the measure 
upheld today. For a woman in Boe's financial straits, the medical 
treatment she seeks is completely out of reach. Unless we are to 
exhume the utterly repudiated9 right-privilege distinction, 10 the 
state action before us cannot stand.11 
As a result of the Supreme Court's decisions in Beal, Maher, 
and Poetker, however, the slate upon which I write is not entirely 
clean, and a mere recitation of apparently well-settled constitu-
tional principles antedating those decisions is therefore insuffi-
cient. But even conceding that some language from those opin-
ions supports the result reached here, that support is at best 
superficial. The issues resolved in those cases are very different 
from those raised here.12 The abortion-funding cases held simply 
that a state or local government may refuse to provide public 
funding for elective abortions; they did not indicate what result 
would obtain where the treatment in question relates to child-
birth instead. 
The error the majority makes is perhaps understandable. As 
a result of the Supreme Court's lengthening list of cases concern-
7. Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977). 
8. But see majority opinion notes 30-32 supra and accompanying text. 
9. Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in the 
Administrative State, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 445, 446 (1977). 
10. See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 360-61 (1976) (plurality opinion)(citations 
omitted): 
"[F]or at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that even though a 
person has no 'right' to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the 
government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are some 
reasons upon which the government may not rely." ... [O]ne such impermissible 
reason [is that the] denial of a public benefit may not be used by the government 
for the purpose of creating an incentive enabling it to achieve what it may not 
command directly . . .. "'[T]his Court now has rejected the concept that consti-
tutional rights turn upon whether a governmental benefit is characterized as a 
"right" or as a "privilege." ' " 
11. One additional difficulty, which Boe does not raise and which the court therefore 
does not address, is the possible argument that the city's policy directive and hospital 
staffing practice infringe the first amendment rights of those indigent women who oppose 
abortion for religious reasons. Were I confronted with that question, I would again con-
clude that only a revival of the right-privilege distinction, see note 10 supra, could insulate 
such state action from otherwise certain constitutional invalidity. See Sherbert v. Verner, 
374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) ("to condition the availability of [governmental] benefits upon 
[one's] willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith effectively penal-
izes the free exercise of her constitutional liberties"). Cf. Note, Abortion, Medicaid, and 
the Constitution, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 120, 151-55 (1979) (first amendment problems of 
abortion-funding restrictions). 
12. See generally L. 'T'ruBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 932 & n.70 (1978). 
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ing contraception13 and abortion, 14 the concept of freedom of 
choice in matters of reproduction has come to refer almost exclu-
sively to decisions not to bear children.15 Clearly, however, such 
freedom must encompass as well the decisions of those individu-
als who do wish to procreate. 16 
Mr. Justice Goldberg recognized the inseparable and com-
plementary nature of the two kinds of individual choices more 
than a decade ago in his concurring opinion in Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), where he observed that failure 
to accord constitutional protection to the private use of contra-
ceptives by married couples17 would not only intrude upon the 
guarantees of the ninth amendment but would also establish an 
unacceptable precedent for state and federal limitation of family 
size despite the absence of a compelling state interest. 18 That is 
13. E.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 
405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See also Poe v. Ullman, 
367 U.S. 497 (1961); Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943). 
14. E.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 99 S. Ct. 3035 (1979); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 
(1979); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Beal v, 
Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976); Planned Parenthood v. 
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9 (1975) (per curiam); Doe 
v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See also Singleton v. 
Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976). 
15. The Supreme Court has heard a comparatively small number of cases directly 
raising questions concerning the right to procreate, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 636 
(1942); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). A number of cases focusing on other issues have 
noted, in passing, rights related to childbearing. See note 4 supra. 
16. The Supreme Court acknowledged this point in Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 472 
n.7 (1977), stating that "[a] woman has at least an equal right to choose to carry her 
fetus to term as to choose to abort it" (emphasis added). 
17. Justice Gl>ldberg wrote of the "basic and fundamental ••• right of privacy in 
marriage." 381 U.S. at 491. The holding in Griswold was subsequently extended to unmar• 
ried individuals via the equal protection clause. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 406 U.S. 438 (1972), 
18. Justice Goldberg reasoned: 
The logic of the dissents would sanction federal or state legislation that seems to 
me even more plainly unconstitutional than the statute before us. Surely the Gov-
ernment, absent a showing of a compelling subordinating state interest, could not 
decree that all husbands and wives must be sterilized after two children have been 
born to them. Yet by their reasoning such an invasion of marital privacy would not 
be subject to constitutional challenge because, while it might be "silly," no provi-
sion of the Constitution specifically prevents the Government from curtailing the 
marital right to bear children and raise a family. While it may shock some of my 
Brethren that the Court today holds that the Constitution protects the right of 
marital privacy, in my view it is far more shocking to believe that the personal 
liberty guaranteed by the Constitution does not include protection against such 
totalitarian limitation of family size, which is at complete variance with our consti-
tutional concepts. Yet, if upon a showing of a slender basis of rationality, a law 
outlawing voluntary birth control by married persons is valid, then, by the same 
reasoning, a law requiring compulsory birth control also would seem to be valid. In 
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precisely what has happened today. Just as Mr. Justice Goldberg 
feared, the majority here has taken "precedent" from cases limit-
ing an individual's freedom not to bear children, Beal, Maher, 
and Poetker, to validate restrictions on the right to procreate. But 
"[t]he individual's freedom to ... reproduce is 'older than the 
Bill of Rights.' " 19 Thus, if history and tradition are to play any 
role in defining those substantive rights shielded by the due pro-
cess clause, see Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 
503-04 (1977) (plurality opinion), 20 then surely the long-
established personal right to procreate, an "intrinsic human 
right, "21 should be accorded significantly greater constitutional 
protection than the only recently recognized "right to abort. " 22 
But even if the reasoning the majority borrows from the 
abortion-funding cases were controlling in principle, additional 
difficulties would remain. 
First, there is a noticeable misfit of the governmental end 
identified and the means selected to effectuate that goal. Even if 
so-called strict judicial scrutiny is not warranted in a case such 
my view, however, both types of law would unjustifiably intrude upon rights of 
marital privacy which are constitutionally protected. 
381 U.S. at 496-97. See note 5 supra. See also Katin, Griswold v. Connecticut: The Justices 
and Connecticut's "Uncommonly Silly Law," 42 NOTRE DAME LAW. 680, 699 (1967) .. 
19. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 
845 (1977) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)). 
20. A plurality of the Court explained in Moore: 
Appropriate limits on substantive due process come not from drawing arbitrary 
lines but rather from careful "respect for the teachings of history [and] solid 
recognition of the basic values that underlie our society." Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 U.S., at 501 (Harlan, J., concurring) .... Out decisions establish that the 
Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of 
the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. 
431 U.S. at 503. 
A footnote at the end of that passage added, in part, the following: 
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), the Court rested its holding in part on 
the constitutional right of parents to assume the primary role in decisions concern-
ing the rearing of their children. That right is recognized because it reflects a 
"strong tradition" founded on "the history and culture of Western civilization," 
and because the parental role "is now established beyond debate as an enduring 
American tradition." Id. at 232. 
431 U.S. at 503 n.12. 
Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice Marshall, also noted the 
significance of "tradition." 4~1 U.S. at 507. See also Bellotti v. Baird, 99 S. Ct. 3035, 
3045 (1979) (plurality opinion); Parham v. J.R., 99 S. Ct. 2493, 2504 (1979); Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,493 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 
497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
21. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 434 U.S. 816, 
845 (1977). See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). 
22. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). 
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as this,23 New Gotham's intrusion into a matter of "family life" 
is sufficiently significant to require a court at least to "examine 
carefully the importance of the governmental interests advanced 
and the extent to which they are served by the challenged 
[action]." Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 
(1977) (plurality opinion). 24 
Granting for the moment that a governmental interest in 
reducing crowding may be a legitimate underlying purpose, such 
an end is furthered only marginally by New Gotham's denial of 
free treatment for childbirth. Certainly, this policy will not dis-
courage the nonindigent from reproducing.25 And although preg-
nancy and childbirth today are processes ordinarily attended by 
:tnedical assistance, 26 delivery of a living infant can occur outside 
a hospital without any medical assistance whatsoever. A woman 
in Boe's financial situation, determined not to abort, can in many 
cases give birth to her child without a physician's aid. That very 
real possibility not only demonstrates the ineffectiveness of the 
New Gotham policy but also reveals another flaw as well: Moth-
ers carrying their pregnancies to term and delivering without 
medical assistance, as well as children born under such circum-
stances, are in much greater jeopardy of suffering some kind of 
serious physical complication, including death.27 Surely New 
Gotham's interest in reducing overpopulation, even among the 
poor, is not permissibly served by increasing risks to the health 
23. Compare text at majority opinion note 49 supra with majority opinion note 24 
supra. 
24. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767-68 (1977) (though "most exacting 
scrutiny" not appropriate for reviewing classification disadvantaging illegitimates, chal-
lenged state action held unconstitutional because it "bears only the most attenuated 
relationship to the asserted goal"); Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Fore-
word: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal 
Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18-21 (1972). 
25. Those able to afford to pay for prenatal care and medical treatment for childbirth 
at a private facility will not be affected in a legal or a practical way by the policy. See 
majority opinion note 1 supra. In some small communities, however, such restrictions on 
a hospital's services may have a broader impact. See a/so Poetker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 
524 (1977)(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
26. See note 2 supra and accompanying text. 
27. Increased availability and acceptance of good prenatal care as well as the greater 
use of hospitals are significant factors in the decreasing maternal mortality rate during 
pregnancy, delivery and the six-week postpartum period. A. GUTrMACHER, PREGNANCY, 
BIRTH, AND FAMILY PLANNING 86-89 (1973). It is instructive to note in this context, more-
over, that in "three of the states with the worst maternal and newborn [mortality J rec-
ords, Mississippi, Alabama, and Arkansas, nearly one quarter of the births take pince 
outside of the hospital." Id. at 87. 
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of those individuals evading the city's policy.28 
One can imagine, moreover, more narrowly tailored schemes 
under which New Gotham's interests could be advanced - alter-
native policies both less onerous to individuals in Boe's class and 
more carefully designed to achieve the city's asserted objective. 29 
For example, New Gotham could instead provide free contracep-
tives or counseling for family planning;30 either service would pro-
mote the city's goal without burdening those women who are 
already pregnant and thus face what must appear to some as a 
medical and moral dilemma.31 For those women in Boe's situation 
who oppose abortion but do not care to rear a child themselves, 
the city could limit its population by arranging for adoptive 
placements in less crowded locales. A number of other possibili-
ties come to mind. 32 
Finally, I have grave reservations about another aspect of the 
New Gotham policy that Boe does not attack directly: the availa-
bility of abortions at any time throughout pregnancy. 33 It is true 
that Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), held only that a state, if 
it desired, could restrict abortions after the first trimester for 
reasons related to maternal health, 410 U.S. at 163, and could 
prohibit abortions following viability in order to preserve fetal 
life, 410 U.S. at 163-64; apparently, nothing in Roe requires states 
to enact such protective legislation. Still, I am troubled by the 
prospect of the New Gotham public hospital's performing abor-
tions up through the final days of pregnancy. 
28. New Gotham, of course, has not asserted nor can we infer that it intends to cure 
its population difficulties by increasing the infant and maternal mortality rate occurring 
in connection with childbirth. Nor can I believe that the majority would approve any 
"modest proposal" along these lines. See also Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 523-24 
(1977)(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
29. Cf. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 772-73 (1977) (though no compelling interest 
need be shown, Court inquires whether classification disadvantaging illegitimates "is 
carefully tuned to alternative considerations" or whether it "extends well beyond the 
asserted purposes"). 
30. The family planning agencies and clinics described by the majority in majority 
opinion note 3 supra provide services only for a fee. 
31. Although under the privacy decisions of the United States Supreme Court, Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 {1973), abortion and 
contraception may appear to be equivalent means of birth control, abortion clearly impli-
cates interests not implicated by contraception. See Carey v. Population Servs. Intl., 431 
U.S. 678, 690 (1977) (contraception, unlike abortion, does not implicate, inter alia, interest 
in protecting potential life). 
32. Indeed, if New Gotham's concern is one regarding the sheer number of its inhabi-
tants, the municipal hospital could provide free abortions for all residents and not only 
those who are indigent. See majority opinion note' 1 supra. 
33. See majority opinion note 5 supra and accompanying text. 
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As a woman's pregnancy progresses beyond the point of fetal 
viability, an abortion becomes more and more likely to result in 
a live birth.34 Given that fact and in view of the official goal of 
promoting population control, I see little difference between New 
Gotham State's legalization of post-viability abortions and a 
state's rescission of its criminal homicide laws. If there is any 
meaning at all to the fourteenth amendment's command that no 
state "shall deprive a person of life . . . without due process of 
law," then a state cannot take the latter course.35 Although Roe 
draws a bright line between a person and a fetus for purposes of 
fourteenth-amendment protection, 410 U.S. at 157-59, the possi-
bility of live births in terminations of advanced pregnancies ob-
scures any such clear distinction between the so-called alterna-
tives, abortion and childbirth, and thus between the constitu-
tional implications of the two procedures. 
It is for this reason, in addition to those I offered in Part I of 
this opinion, that I think Boe's challenge to the city's interpreta-
tion of the hospital charter is correct; at some point in pregnancy, 
at least after viability of the fetus, childbirth is a "medically 
necessary" procedure, for an "abortion," to the extent that term 
implies fetal death, no longer remains an acceptable alternative. 
I would therefore strike down the challenged policy as incon-
sistent with both the hospital's own charter and the United States 
Constitution. 
DANIEL, Senior Circuit Judge, concurring. 
On each issue, I agree with the conclusion reached by Judge 
Adams joined by Judges Baker and Carson. But because those 
results seem extraordinary, if not ironic, I add the following 
thoughts that I believe must be addressed en route. 
34. See Hardy, Privacy and Public Funding: Maher u. Roe as the Interaction of Roe 
u. Wade and Dandridge u. Williams, 18 ARiz. L. REV. 903, 933-34 n.164 (1976), Cf, Colnutti 
v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979) (invalidation for vagueness of!egislation imposing medi-
cal standard of care to maximize chances of fetal survival). 
35. In Roe u. Wade, the Court suggested that the right to life accorded to persons by 
the fourteenth amendment requires the states to criminalize the taking of such life. See 
410 U.S. at 156-58 & n.54. See also Landrum v. Moats, 576 F.2d 1320, 1325 (8th Cir,), 
("The right to life is fundamental and is protected against unreasonable or unlawful 
takings by the procedural due process safeguards of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments."), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 912 (1978). 
* * * • * * 
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The question of "medical necessity" is, in my view, far more 
difficult than either the majority or the dissenting opinion inti-
mates. It raises a number of problems that neither analysis fully 
explores. 
The majority's complete and unquestioning reliance on the 
opinions in Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977), merits initial atten-
tion. The narrow issue before the Court in Beal was whether 
Pennsylvania could, consistent with Title XIX of the Social Secu-
rity Act, distinguish "medically necessary" abortions from other 
abortions. 1 Certainly from a lay or intuitive perspective, such a 
distinction is not totally unsupportable: one can easily imagine a 
woman seeking to terminate a life-threatening ectopic preg-
nancy;2 an abortion performed under such circumstances would 
be meaningfully described as "medically necessary."3 Such a case 
1. Pursuant to the regulations challenged in Beal, Pennsylvania limited Medicaid 
assistance "to those abortions that are certified by physicians as medically necessary." 
432 U.S. at 441. 
2. In an ectopic pregnancy, gestation occurs in a site other than the uterine cavity, 
typically in a Fallopian tube. Once diagnosed, "abdominal operation is necessary at 
once." A. GUTTMACHER, PREGNANCY, BIRTH AND FAMILY PLANNING 125 (1973). See T. STED-
MAN, STEDMAN's MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1134 (4th Unabr. Lawyers' ed. 1976). 
3. Title XIX of the Social Security Act speaks in terms of medical necessity in 
identifying those persons eligible for Medicaid assistance (persons with "insufficient . . . 
income and resources to meet the costs of necessary medical .•. services") and not in 
describing the precise kinds of medical services to be funded under the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 
1396a(a)(10)(C)(i) (1976). See 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1976). Compare Roe v. Norton, 522 F.2d 
928, 933 (2d Cir. 1975), with 522 F.2d at 939 (Mulligan, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part), on remand, 408 F. Supp. 660 (D. Conn. 1975), revd. sub nom. Maher v. Roe, 
432 .U.S. 454· (1977). 
Although the Pennsylvania regulation at issue in Beal purportedly provided financial 
assistance only for those abortions deemed "medically necessary," it is unclear whether 
the specifications listed in the regulation in fact comport with that description. For exam-
ple, abortions performed under circumstances where continued pregnancy would jeopar-
dize the mental health of the mother appear not to be covered unless the pregnancy 
resulted from "statutory or forcible rape or incest." 432 U.S. at 441 n.3. If mental or 
psychological factors are sufficient to create medical necessity under some circumstances, 
however, it makes little sense to ignore such factors under other circumstances, as the 
Pennsylvania regulation apparently requires; on the other hand, if mental health always 
presents an appropriate consideration, it is unclear what a special provision for rape and 
incest adds to the regulation. In addition, the Pennsylvania regulation does provide fund-
ing for abortions where "[t]here is documented medical evidence that an infant may be 
born with incapacitating physical deformity or mental deficiency ...• " 432 U.S. at 441 
n.3. Whatever one may think of the desirability of terminating a pregnancy in such a case, 
it is not self-evident that such a termination is a matter of medical necessity since contin-
uation of the pregnancy presents no immediate health threat to the mother and any 
perceived "threat" to the well-being of the fetus caused by the likely abnormalities is 
outweighed by the greater threat of fetal death posed by the abortion. Cf. Becker v. 
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is, moreover, easily distinguishable from a termination of preg-
nancy sought solely for reasons of maternal convenience.4 
Given that narrow issue, the majority in Beal properly began 
its analysis by considering Pennsylvania's effort to differentiate 
two classes of abortions. Resolving that question should have 
Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978) (rejecting child's 
asserted fundamental right to be born as a whole, functional human being), revg., Park 
v. Chessin, 60 App. Div. 2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1977); Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977 
Term - Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5, 48 n.186 
(1978) (differing public opinions regarding abortions where pregnancy poses threat to 
mother's physical health and abortions where the baby might be born deformed). 
Perhaps the Supreme Court saw Pennsylvania's goal as one of fostering only "normal 
childbirth," 432 U.S. at 446 (emphasis added), and not one of defining medical necessity. 
See Doe v. Mundy, 441 F. Supp. 447, 451 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (unsuccessful challenge to 
county's refusal to fund abortions where pregnancy resulted from rape or incest or when 
infant may be deformed). But whether or not the regulation challenged in Beal provides 
an accurate catalogue of "medically necessary abortions," I am satisfied that that term 
is not meaningless and is susceptible of codification. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 191· 
92 (1973). 
Cf., e.g., Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, 591 F.2d 121, 126-27, 134 (1st Cir.) (Massachu-
setts's limiting Medicaid funding only to life-saving abortions unreasonable and anti-
thetical to medical definition of medical necessity; federal "Hyde amendment" substan-
tively alters Medicaid Act), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 952 (1979); Doe v. Kenley, 584 F.2d 
1362, 1366 (4th Cir. 1978) ("therapeutic abortions" include all those where pregnancy 
poses "substantial endangerment to health"; "endangerment to life" standard ambig-
uous and too narrow); Zbaraz v. Quern, 572 F.2d 582, 584-85 (7th Cir. 1978) ("plain-
meaning" semantic distinction between "necessary for the preservation of life" and 
"necessary for the preservation of health"); Doe v. Busbee, 471 F. Supp. 1326 (N.D. Ga. 
1979) (reimbursement for less than all medically necessary abortions inconsistent with 
objectives of Title XIX; Hyde amendment does not substantively limit Title XIX); 
Roe v. Casey, 464 F. Supp. 487, 499-502 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (Pennsylvania cannot limit 
Medicaid funding only to those abortions necessary to save mother's life; Title XIX 
requires states to provide all medically necessary abortions); D __ R __ v. Mitchell, 
456 F. Supp. 609 (D. Utah 1978) (reasoning in Beal v. Doe validates Utah's limited abor-
tion funding for only those abortions necessary to save the life of a mother); Doe v. 
Mundy, 441 F. Supp. 447 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (county may choose to fund only those abor-
tions where pregnancy threatens mother's life); Emma G. v. Edwards, 434 F. Supp. 1048, 
1050 (E.D. La. 1977) (stipulation that, inter alia, "[t]herapeutic abortions are recognized 
as medically necessary procedures"); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 165 N.J. Super. 443,454, 
398 A.2d 587, 592 (Ch. Div. 1979) ("medically necessary abortions" include those where 
pregnancy endangers life or health); Butler, The Right to Medicaid Payment for Abortion, 
28 HASTINGS L.J:931, 953-61 (1977) (pre-Beal, Maher, and Poe/her analysis of "medically 
necessary" in the abortion context); Note, State Restrictions on Medicaid Coverage of 
Medically Necessary Services, 78 CoLUM. L. REv. 1491, 1495-502, 1510-16 (1978) (abortion-
funding restrictions in light of analysis of "medical necessity"); Note, Abortion, Medicaid, 
and the Constitution, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 120, 135 (1979) (taxonomy of possible abortion• 
funding restrictions). 
4. See Zbaraz v. Quern, 469 F. Supp. 1212, 1221 (N.D. Ill.) ("medically necessary" 
abortions constitute only one fifth of cases in which pregnant woman desires an abortion), 
probable jurisdiction noted sub nom. Williams v. Zbaraz, 100 S. Ct. 447 (1979). Judge 
Everett recognizes this point in his dissent, see dissenting opinion note 1 supra. See also 
Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 450-51 n. * (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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been the end of the matter.5 But because of arguments raised by 
the plaintiffs and Title XIX's requirement of reasonableness, 6 the 
Court in Beal proceeded to compare abortions with childbirth. 
Noting the state's "important and legitimate interest ... in pro-
tecting . . . human life, "7 the Beal majority shifted its focus from 
therapeutic versus elective abortions to elective abortions versus 
childbirth,8 thereby suggesting that the latter pair somehow con-
stitute alternative medical responses to a single condition, preg-
nancy. 
But such a shift in focus is misleading. Nothing in Beal indi-
cates that the Pennsylvania regulation was prompted by the 
eventual availability of alternative services for pregnant women 
or even that the state's interest in protecting human life played 
a role in the drafting of the regulation. 9 With all due deference to 
the Justices of tlie Supreme Court, the more obvious and sensible 
basis for upholding the Pennsylvania regulation as "reasonable" 
lies in the fact that, for some women, pregnancy presents no 
medical difficulty while, for others, the condition may be life- or 
health-threatening and thus may require medical treatment. 10 
Pennsylvania simply undertook to provide assistance in the latter 
5. It is unnecessary, for purposes of this analysis, to determine how the Court should 
have resolved the issue in Beal, given a clear focus on the precise question presented. See 
note 3 supra. 
6. In challenging the statute, plaintiffs had argued that, because childbirth presents 
greater health risks and is costlier than abortion, the exclusion of non therapeutic abortions 
from Medicaid coverage was unreasonable, in violation of the requirements of Title XIX, 
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17) (1976). See Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 445 (1977). 
7. 432 U.S. at 445-46. 
8. See 432 U.S. at 445-46. 
As one court has observed, the Court in Beal "provided no direct response to [thej 
contentions" that the exclusion of nontherapeutic abortions from Medicaid coverage was 
unreasonable on both economic and health grounds. D __ }L_ v. Mitchell, 456 F. 
Supp. 609, 618 (D. Utah 1978). 
9. In its briefs, Pennsylvania did not seek to justify its regulation on this basis but 
invoked other grounds instead. Brief for Petitioners and Reply Brief for Petitioners, Beal 
v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977). But see Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979) (Pennsyl-
vania's defense of other abortion restrictions suggests goal of fetal protection); Roe v. 
Casey, 464 F. Supp. 487, 501 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (Pennsylvania refuses to finance nonlifesav-
ing abortions because of "moral repugnance" felt by state legislature). Arguably, reasons 
related to the protection of potential life prior to viability were not offered in Beal because 
they may have appeared to have been foreclosed by Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 150-52 
(1973). See generally Perry, The Abortion Funding Cases: A Comment on the Supreme 
Court's Role in American Government, 66 GEO. L.J. 1191, 1196 (1978); Comment, Equal 
Protection and Welfare Legislation: The Need for a Principled Approach, 1 U. PUGET 
SOUND L. REV. 323, 342 (1978). 
10. See Roe v. Norton, 522 F.2d 928, 940 (2d Cir.) (Mulligan, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part), on remand, 408 F. Supp. 660 (D. Conn. 1975), revd. sub nom. 
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). 
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category .11 That a pregnancy presenting no medical difficulties 
will ultimately result in childbirth is irrelevant. The Beal major-
ity thus not only obscured the relatively simple issue before it but 
also gratuitously invited the conclusion, articulated by Justice 
Brennan and then adopted by the majority in this case, that 
provision of abortions renders medical services related to child-
birth medically "unnecessary."12 
Though I therefore find the logic in Beal questionable with 
respect to the precise issue presented by that case, such reasoning 
carries considerably more force on the facts before us today. The 
New Gotham public hospital charter, unlike the Pennsylvania 
regulation, speaks not of medically necessary abortions, but 
rather of medically necessary services in general.13 Regardless of 
what constitutes standard medical practice in American ob-
stetrics today, a factor that the dissent in this case considers 
determinative, 14 prenatal care and medical assistance related 
to childbirth are certainly "unnecessary" - medically or other-
wise - for any woman who is not pregnant. For each indigent 
pregnant woman in New Gotham who accepts the offered abor-
tion, then, such prenatal and delivery services become not only 
"unnecessary" but also impossible to perform. Some such 
women, of course, may reject the free termination of pregnancy 
offered by the city. The question then becomes whether under 
those circumstances "medically necessary" services must include 
prenatal care and procedures incident to childbirth. Despite my 
own feeling that the New Gotham policy is unwise and perverse, 
I must answer that question in the negative. Considerations of 
fairness, akin to those underlying estoppel, 15 preclude a woman 
who could have voluntarily obviated all need for such services 
from arguing that, as a result of her choice to forgo that opportun-
ity, those services·have become "necessary."18 Any other conclu-
sion would drain that term of all meaning. 
11. I put aside the question whether the Pennsylvania regulation challenged in Beal 
provides a suitable tool for attaining the presumed governmental goal. See note 3 supra. 
12. See majority opinion notes 13-14 supra. 
13. See majority opinion note 1 supra and accompanying text. 
14. See dissenting opinion notes 2-3 supra and accompanying text 
15. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 691 (4th ed. 1971). 
16. In such cases, the continuation of pregnancy and consequent eligibility for prena-
tal and delivery care are voluntary, even if conception was not. Cf. Gilbert v. General Elec. 
Co., 375 F. Supp. 367, 375 (E.D. Va. 1974) (condition of pregnancy not "voluntary" simply 
because statistically low birth rates indicate "pregnancy can to a large extent be 
avoided"), affd., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975), revd., 429 U.S. 125 (1976). There may be, 
of course, some indigent pregnant women who do not abort because they never learn of 
their opportunity to do so. See Note, The Abortion Alternatiue and the Patient's Right to 
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Likewise, on the constitutional question, I feel compelled to 
join the majority, though only .after considerable further exami-
nation of the issue. 
The analysis in Judge Adams's opinion, although seemingly 
unfamiliar, is not, as Judge Everett claims, something "pull[ed] 
from thin air."17 Its roots can be traced back several years to the 
Supreme Court's decision in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 
(1970), upholding the constitutionality of a Maryland regulation 
that imposed a $240 or $250 ceiling on assistance to a single 
family under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children pro-
gram. Plaintiffs in that case had challenged the regulation as a 
violation of the equal protection clause on the theory that it clas-
sified families according to size and deprived members of large 
families of aid sufficient to meet their subsistence requirements, 
as determined by the state's "standard of need" formula. 18 In 
refuting that challenge, the Court found the system justifiable on 
a number of valid and rational bases asserted by the state, 19 in-
cluding Maryland's desire to provid~ "incentives for family plan-
ning," 397 U.S. at 484~ 
Not only does Dandridge stand for the proposition that the 
minimally demanding rational basis test governs a state's alloca-
tion of its limited public funds, 20 but --: like Beal, Maher, and 
Poelker - it also endorses official involvement in matters of re-
productive control, 21 even without the support of a compelling 
state interest, so long as that official involvement falls short of 
Know, 1978 WASH. U. L.Q. 167. One can imagine, for example, an indigent pregnant 
woman who, unaware of the policy directive and not desiring prenatal care, delays her 
initial visit to the hospital until labor has commenced. Although in such circumstances 
the opportunity to obviate the "need" for medical assistance related to childbirth may 
seem more questionable, Boe, and thus the class she represents, does not fall within this 
category. The mere possibility of such cases, I think, provides no answer for this lawsuit 
but does raise difficult questions concerning whether it is ever "too late" in a woman's 
pregnancy for an abortion. See notes 51-72 and accompanying text infra. 
17. See text following dissenting opinion note 5 supra. 
18. The Court explained the mechanics of the challenged state action, 397 U.S. at 
473-75. 
19. The Court stated explicitly that, since the action in question lay in the "area of 
economics and social welfare," it could withstand the equal protection challenge upon the 
showing of any "reasonable basis." 397 U.S. at 485. 
20. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 479 (1977). 
21. Commentators have read Dandridge as a case authorizing limited governmental 
intrusion into individual decisions regarding family planning and procreation. Shaw, 
Procreation and the Population Problem, 55 N.C. L. REv. 1165, 1168 (1977); Note, Legal 
Analysis and Population Control: The Problem of Coercion, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1856, 1856-
62 (1971): But see Rabin, Population Control Through Financial Incentives, 23 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1353, 1361 (1972). 
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imposing outright restrictions on individual choice. 22 More signif-
icantly, Dandridge also establishes that governmental interests in 
limiting family size may be among the legitimate state objectives 
satisfying the rationality standard. 
This reading of Dandridge was invoked four years later by 
Mr. Justice Powell in his concurring opinion in Cleveland Board 
of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974), as authority for the 
proposition that "[u]ndoubtedly Congress could ... constitu-
tionally seek to discourage excessive population growth by limit-
ing tax deductions for dependents." 414 U.S. at 651. Though the 
means for promoting population control selected by New Gotham 
differs from both the vehicle sanctioned in Dandridge and that 
approved by Powell in LaFleur, the point is clear: The Constitu-
tion permits a state, for reasons less than compelling, 23 to seek to 
influence individual procreative decisions, at least through less 
absolute means than total prohibitions.24 New Gotham has done 
22. The inquiry in Dandridge was confined to "incentives for family planning." 397 
U.S. at 484 (emphasis added). See generally Dixon, The Supreme Court and Equality: 
Legislative Classifications, Desegregation, and Reverse Discrimination, 62 CORNELL L. 
REV. 494, 513-14 n.102 (1977); Note, supra note 21, at 1858-60. 
23. Some elaboration of the compelling state interest doctrine becomes necessary 
here. The standard invocations of this test fail to make clear whether the compelling 
character of a particular governmental interest stems from some intrinsic feature of that 
interest itself, regardless of the surrounding circumstances, or whether those surround-
ing circumstances help determine the compelling or noncompelling nature of the interest, 
The phrase "compelling state interest" suggests the former. The timetable adopted in 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-64 (1973), however, under which various state interests 
mature to an ultimately compelling point as a woman's pregnancy progresses, suggests 
that it is not some inherent characteristic of the interest itself that renders it compelling 
but rather some additional factor. Thus, while state interests in population control may 
become compelling in certain emergency situations of extreme and severe overcrowding, 
defendants do not argue that such interests are compelling under the circumstances 
extant in New Gotham. See majority opinion notes 2 & 45 supra and accompanying text. 
Cf. Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 314 (1978) (Powell, J.) ("interest 
of diversity is compelling in the context of a university's admissions program"); Kore-
matsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (military urgency, during time of war with 
Japanese Empire, renders governmental interest in security sufficiently compelling to 
justify exclusion of persons of Japanese ancestry from West Coast). 
24. The Court's language in Carey v. Population Serva. Intl., 431 U.S. 678 (1978), 
decided immediately before the abortion-funding cases and cited by Judge Everett in his 
dissent, dissenting opinion note 6 supra, while presenting some analytical inconsistencies, 
is not necessarily to the contrary. Though the Court in that case confronted legislation 
limiting access to contraceptives rather than barring their use, the statutory scheme did 
prohibit the distribution of contraceptives under certain circumstances end provided 
criminal penalties for violations of that prohibition. Thus, the legislation invalidated in 
Carey resembles much more closely the "absolute obstacles" struck down in Roe v. Wade, 
410 U.S. 113 (1973), than the positive financial incentives designed to encourage one 
choice over its alternative, at issue in the abortion-funding cases and before us in the 
instant appeal. It is the use of criminal sanctions that apparently renders an obstacle 
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no more.25 
The analysis in Dandridge and LaFleur not only presages the 
reasoning adopted in the abortion-funding cases but also harmo-
nizes with a number of suggestions offered by commentators for 
encouraging decreased reproduction. 26 Instead of responding to 
perceived problems of undue population growth by recommend-
ing strict limitations on family size, these commentators advo-
cate programs designed to restructure the incentives and disin-
centives that presently seem to favor reproduction. 27 Thus, for 
example, such diverse laws as the tax exemptions for dependent 
children and prohibitions on homosexual marriages might be al-
tered to encourage, though not to compel, decreased procrea-
tion. 28 Official adoption of such an incentive system would pre-
sumably be consistent with the language of Dandridge and with 
Justice Powell's reading thereof and, consequently, would be 
immune from the almost-always-fatal application of strict judi-
cial scrutiny.29 It would, moreover, find particularly strong and 
fresh support in the kind of reasoning used in Beal, Maher, and 
Poelker, 30 which commits such matters to majoritarian determi-
nation.31 New Gotham's policy directive and manner of staffing 
impermissibly "absolute" or "direct." See Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 386 n.7 
(1979). See also Frug, The Judicial Power of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 780 (1978) 
(denial of all welfare funds to those exercising protected right constitutes impermissible 
penalty); Hardy, Privacy and Public Funding: Maher v. Roe as the Interaction of Roe v. 
Wade and Dandridge v. Williams, 18 Aruz. L. REV. 903, 912 n.51 (1976). 
25. See text at majority opinion note 46 supra. 
New Gotham is seeking not to discourage childbirth itself but rather to achieve a rate 
of population growth it deems desirable. Compare Perry, supra note 9, at 1196, with Note, 
Abortion, Medicaid, and the Constitution, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 120, 129-30 (1979). 
26. See Note, supra note 21, at 1874-75. The author classifies such proposals as part 
of a "regulationist," as distinguished from "voluntarist," approach to population control, 
while noting the "conceptual fuzziness" of the two categories. Id. at 1870. Similar sugges-
tions appear in Gray, Compulsory Sterilization in a Free Society: Choices and Dilemmas, 
41 U. C1N. L. REv. 529, 567-71 (1972), and Rabin, supra note 21. See also Emerson, Nine 
Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 M1cH. L. REV. 219, 232 (1965). 
27. See, e.g., Rabin, supra note 21; Note, supra note 21, at 1870. 
28. For additional suggestions, see Barnett, The Constitutionality of Selected Fer-
tility Control Policies, 55 N.C. L. REv. 357 (1977); Driver, Population Polifies of State 
Governments in the United States: Some Preliminary Observations, 15 V1LL. L. REV. 818 
(1970); Rabin, supra note 21; Shepard, Federal Taxation and Population Control, 55 N.C. 
L. REv. 385 (1977); Note, supra note 21, at 1874 n.83. See Dembitz, Should Public Policy 
Give Incentives to Welfare Mothers to Limit the Number of Their Children?, 4 FAM. L.Q. 
130 (1970). 
29. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term - Foreword: In Search of Evolving 
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 
1, 8 (1972). 
30. See text at majority opinion notes 26-36 supra. 
· 31. Beal, Maher, and Poelker arguably return to the political process decisions that 
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. its municipal hospital constitute precisely the sort of politically 
fashioned incentive system that such an approach suggests. 
Judge Everett's effort to distinguish on the basis of history 
and tradition the right to prevent or terminate a pregnancy, on 
the one hand, from the right to bear children, on the other, 32 does 
not compel a different conclusion. Allowing a woman some mea-
sure of reproductive freedom, including a limited right to abort, 
did not begin with Roe u. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). As the 
Court's opinion in Roe points out, "at common law, at the time 
of the adoption of our Constitution, and throughout the major 
portion of the 19th century, ... a woman enjoyed a substantially 
broader right to terminate a pregnancy"33 than she did immedi-
ately before Roe was decided. In other words, given the analysis 
in Roe, historical considerations alone will not provide sufficient 
support for the line Judge Everett seeks to draw. But even if such 
a distinction were tenable, there is another reason why Judge 
Everett's reliance on cases like Moore u. City of East Cleveland, 
431 U.S. 494 (1977), misses the mark: Although Moore did em-
phasize the constitutional significance of "history and tradition," 
it did so in the context of striking down a city's absolute prohibi-
tion of certain kinds of family living arrangements.34 Neither 
Moore nor the other cases Judge Everett cites, however, provide 
that history and tradition must limit a city in its selection of 
policy preferences or value judgments, the kind of official action 
at issue here.35 
Of course, the tacit thrust of Judge Everett's reasoning may 
be that the Supreme Court's language in Moore, together with the 
holdings of Beal, Maher, and Poelker, indicates some sort of with-
drawal from the broad pronouncements of Roe. That is, perhaps 
the emphasis in. Moore on traditional or "basic values"36 and the 
the Supreme Court had committed to individual choice in Roe v. Wade. See L. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 929-32 (1978), 
32. See text at dissenting opinion notes 12-22 supra. 
33. 410 U.S. at 140. See Means, The Phoenix of Abortional Freedom: Is a Penumbra/ 
or Ninth-Amendment Right About to Arise from the Nineteenth-Century Legislative 
Ashes of a Fourteenth-Century Common-Law Liberty?, 17 N.Y.L.F. 335 (1971). But see 
Byrn, An American Tragedy: The Supreme Court on Abortion, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 807, 
815-27 (1973). See generally J. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA (1978). 
34. 431 U.S. at 503 (plurality opinion). Those violating the ordinance struck down in 
Moore could stand convicted of a criminal offense. See 431 U.S. at 496 (plurality opinion), 
35. See dissenting opinion notes 16-22 supra and accompanying text. But see United 
States Dept. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (congressional effort to favor 
traditional living arrangements through food stamp program held unconstitutional), 
36. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion) 
(quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring)), 
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''sanctity of the family,"37 along with the Court's apparent "anti-
abortion" rulings in the abortion-funding cases, constitutes a 
departure from the position embraced in Roe. 38 Read in that man-
ner, Beal, Maher, and Poelker would offer no support for the 
result we reach here. Although a numb~r of critics of the abortion-
funding cases have indeed described them in this fashion, 39 I am 
reluctant to draw a conclusion that so completely contradicts the 
Supreme Court's own assertion that these decisions '~signal[ ] no 
retreat from Roe or the cases applying it."40 I leave to future 
students of the Court's recent decisions - and to the Court itself 
- the task of determining whether such far-reaching implications 
are to be read from between the lines of explicit statements to the 
contrary. 
Nor am I persuaded by Judge Everett's effort to undercut the 
public hospital policy on the ground that it is not sufficiently 
tailored to the purpose for which it was adopted. First, as a mech-
anism for promoting population control, it is at least as effective 
as the policies upheld in Beal, Maher, and Poelker were for en-
couraging childbirth.41 In those cases, as in the situation before 
us, the policy in question had an impact only upon the poor. 42 The 
37. 431 U.S. at 503 (plurality opinion). 
38. Perhaps Judge Everett suggests that the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade deviates 
so significantly from American tradition that "it [cannot] long survive," Moore v. City 
of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 501 (1977) (plurality opinion) (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 
367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)), and that the abortion-funding cases 
reflect the beginning of its demise. 
39. See, e.g., L. ThmE, supra note 31, at 933-34 n.77; Clark, Legislative Motivation 
and Fundamental Rights in Constitutional Law, 15 SAN Dmao L. REV. 953, 1012, 1019 
(1978); Perry, supra note 9, at 1191; Simson, Abortion, Poverty, and the Equal Protection 
of the Lauis, 13 GA. L. REv. 505 (1979); Susman, Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton Revisited 
in 1976 and 1977 - Reviewed?; Revived?; Revested?; Reversed?; or Revoked?, 22 ST. 
Louis U. L.J. 581 (1979); 7 CAP. U. L. REv. 483 (1978); Note, Denial of Public Funds for 
Nontherapeutic Abortions, 10 CONN. L. REv. 487, 500-07 (1978); Note, The Supreme 
Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARV. L. REV. 70, 144-45 (1977); Note, Medicaid Funding for Abor-
tions: The Medicaid Statute and the Equal Protection Clause, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV. 421, 438-
41 (1978); 21 How. L.J. 937, 948-49 (1978); 24 Lov. L. REV. 301, 307 (1978); Note, Indigent 
Women - What Right to Abortion?, 23 N.Y. L. ScH. L. REv. 709, 739 (1978); 52 TuL. L. 
REV. 179, 187-88 (1977); 13 TuLsA L.J. 287 (1977). 
Cf. Canby, Government Funding, Abortions, and the Public Forum, 1979 AR1z. ST. 
LI 11 (suggesting analogy of the public forum to resolve difficulties of abortion-funding 
cases); Hardy, supra note 24, at 919 (suggesting, but ultimately rejecting, "hybrid" consti-
tutional approach to require public funding of abortions). 
40. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475 (1977). 
41. See Simson, supra note 39, at 513; Note, 6 HOFSTRA L. REV., supra note 39, at 
441. 
42. Indeed, this fact ·may serve to enhance the legitimacy of New Gotham's policy. 
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), upheld the constitutionality of compulsory sterilization 
of the "feebleminded" on the theory that those who "sap the strength of the State" could 
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fact that other avenues for procuring the desired medical treat-
ment were available to the nonindigent did not prompt the Court 
in Beal, Maher, and Poelker to question the legitimacy of the 
vehicle used to achieve the asserted goal. 43 Indeed, under the very 
relaxed standard of review applied by the Court in the abortion-
funding cases, it is not clear that any means-end fit need be 
examined at all. 44 
And, to the extent that Judge Everett suggests that the flaw 
in the public hospital policy lies in its failure to encourage abor-
tion in each New Gotham pregnancy, Supreme Court authority 
is clearly to the contrary. It is well established that, when a state 
or local government embarks upon a program of reform, it is not 
constitutionally compelled to "strike at all evils at the same 
time."45 In other words, reform "may take one step at a time, 
addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most 
acute .... "46 The possibility of additional or more far-reaching 
ways to reduce New Gotham's population does not undermine the 
legitimacy of the means selected.47 
be required to make such "sacrifices." 274 U.S. at 207. If Buck remains sound, the less 
onerous policy directive of New Gotham, because it does only affect the indigent, could 
be supportable on a similar theory. See also Bolner & Jacobsen, The Right to Procreate: 
The Dilemma of Overpopulation and the United States Judiciary, 25 LOY. L. REV, 236, 
245 (1979). 
43. The Court noted in Maher that even indigent women desiring abortions could still 
seek such treatment from private sources. 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977). See Beal v. Doe, 432 
U.S. 438, 459 n.2 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
44. The Court merely inquired whether the "distinction drawn between childbirth 
and nontherapeutic abortion ... [was] 'rationally related' to a 'constitutionally permis-
sible' purpose." Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. at 478. 
45. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 39 (1973); Katzenbach 
v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 657 (1966). See Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 57-58 (1977); 
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 495 (1974); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 
(1970). 
46. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 495 (1974); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. 
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 39 (1973). 
47. Even reform undertaken on a piecemeal basis is, of course, subject to equal 
protection limitations. Thus, for example, a preliminary step in a broader population 
control program singling out blacks for decreased procreation would evoke rigorous judi-
cial scrutiny under the equal protection clause. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 536, 
541 (1942); Shaw, supra note 21, at 1166. See also Califano v. Westcott, 99 S. Ct. 2666, 
2663 (1979) ("Congress may not legislate 'one step at a time' when that step is drawn along 
the line of gender"). But alleged classifications based on indigency do not trigger such 
stringent review. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 471 (1977). 
Boe's plight, like that of the women challenging the restrictions in the abortion-
funding cases, is that without state assistance she can afford to purchase neither an 
abortion nor medical care incident to childbirth. Given its discretion regarding the ex-
penditure of its public funds, however, New Gotham could have chosen to subsidize 
neither choice. Clearly, Boe does not argue, nor could she, that the Constitution requires 
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It is of no moment, moreover, to observe that even poor 
women can continue to reproduce without any medical assistance 
whatsoever.48 An analogous point, when made in the abortion-
funding cases, carried negligible constitutional weight. 49 Indeed, 
the fact that even indigent women can choose to carry their preg-
nancies to term demonstrates the nonabsolute nature of the bur-
den imposed upon them by the city. And, as the opinion for the 
majority in this case explains, it is precisely this nonabsolute 
nature of the burden that sustains the policy and practice in 
question. 50 
Essentially identical reasoning, with slight elaboration, an-
swers Judge Everett's final point, where he questions New 
Gotham State's allowing abortions to be performed throughout 
pregnancy - a necessary condition for the effective implementa-
tion of the city's policy directive. 51 
Judge Everett's concern apparently stems from the possibil-
ity that an abortion performed during advanced pregnancy might 
result in a live birth. If that be the case, however, New Gotham 
State's lack of legislation prohibiting abortions is irrelevant, for 
upon birth, a "person" within the scope of the state's homicide 
laws has come into existence.52 Whether or not ~he fourteenth 
amendment requires a state to impose criminal penalties for de-
priving such "persons" of life53 is also irrelevant, for New Gotham 
states or cities to provide medical assistance for all indigent pregnant women: See 432 U.S. 
at 480 n.13. 
48. See text at dissenting opinion notes 26, 27 supra. 
49. In dissent in the abortion-funding cases, Justice Marshall predicted that the 
Court's holdings would result in the procurement of more unsafe and illegal abortions by 
the indigent. 432 U.S. at 455-56 n.1. 
50. See majority opinion note 32 and text at majority opinion note 46 supra. 
51. The absence of any state criminal prohibitions against abortion permits the policy 
directive to operate in a noncoercive manner (i.e., simply to encourage abortions rather 
than to compel them) and simultaneously to maximize each indigent pregnant woman's 
opportunities to choose the result favored by the city. 
52. Before birth, however, no such "person" exists. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 
157-59 (1973), and cases cited therein. See also Commonwealth v. Edelin, __ Mass.-, 
359 N.E.2d 4, 12 (1976) (state manslaughter statute construed, in light of Roe, to apply 
only after live birth and only to defendant's acts in postnatal period). Cf. Planned Parent-
hood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 83-84 (1976) (criminal failure to protect livebom infant 
"surely will be subject to prosecution ... under the State's criminal statutes"). 
53. Although the matter is not free from uncertainty, the Court in Roe read the 
fourteenth amendment not merely to authorize governmental protection of a person's life 
but to "entitle" him to such protection from the state. See 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973). But 
see L. TRIBE, supra note 31, at 929 n.61 (noting state action problem in such reasoning); 
Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term - Foreword: On Protecting the Poor 
Through the I[ourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REv. '{, 17 (1969) ("The due process 
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State has not repealed its criminal homicide laws, but only its 
abortion prohibitions. 
The problem that arises, however, is that where live births 
do in fact result from the abortions encouraged by the city, the 
single goal of the official action challenged here, population con-
trol, is not advanced. The question, as I see it, then becomes 
whether this incongruity of means and end renders the policy 
directive unconstitutional because it is irrationa!G' as applied to 
women whose pregnancies have advanced so far that any termi-
nation might yield a live birth. 
The problem is complicated by the ambiguity of the term 
"abortion" itself. In the more typical lawsuit where plaintiffs 
challenge state action alleged to restrict their freedom of choice 
in aborting pregnancies, a number of personal privacy-based in-
terests can be asserted. The classic case of this variety, Roe u. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), considered such personal interests as 
the possibility of direct harm from pregnancy and the future 
stress, both physical and psychological, of maternity and child 
care.55 A more specific focus emerged in Planned Parenthood u. 
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), where, in overturning Missouri's 
spousal consent requirement, the Court emphasized the privacy 
interest attributable to a woman's direct and immediate physical 
involvement in pregnancy.58 Theoretically, the kinds of interests 
recognized by the Court in those cases could be honored by a 
termination of pregnancy simpliciter, regardless of the fate of the 
fetus, or by placement of any live-born child for adoption.G7 
But as the instant case - as well as cases concerning abor-
tions for eugenic reasons58 - indicates, a preference for abortion 
clause inveighs only against certain 'deprivations' by the 'state,' occurrences which seem-
ingly cannot occur by mere default."); Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term - Fore• 
word: Toward a Model of ~oles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1, 
33 n.144 (1973). Cf. Landrum v. Moats, 576 F.2d 1320 (8th Cir.) (allegation that police 
officers, under color of state law, unreasonably deprived deceased of life presents cogniza-
ble claim that fourteenth amendment has been transgressed), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 912 
(1978). 
54. See notes 19-21 and accompanying text supra. 
55. See 410 U.S. at 153. See also Bellotti v. Baird, 99 S. Ct. 3035, 3048 (1979) (plural-
ity opinion); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973). 
56. See 428 U.S. at 71. 
57. In other words, satisfaction of the interests identified in Roe and Planned 
Parenthood do not require that an abortion cause fetal death. See Note, Choice Rights 
and Abortion: The Begetting Choice Right and State Obstacles tq Choose in Light of 
Artificial Womb Technology, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 877, 899-900 (1978). See also Tribe, supra 
note 53, at 27. 
58. See, e.g., Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979); Becker v. Schwartz, 
46 N.Y.2d 401,386 N.E.2d 807,413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 
846 (Tex. 1975); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1976), 
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over childbirth can be motivated by interests other than those 
satisfied by mere return of the woman's body to its nonpregnant 
state or by obviation of child-rearing responsibilities.59 In these 
cases, the sole immediate purpose for which the abortion is per-
formed is feticide. Where a pregnancy has so far advanced that 
its termination would produce a live fetus (then child), such a 
purpose cannot be served. 
Significantly, the Supreme Court in its groundbreaking deci-
sion in Roe circumvented the issue. By adopting viability as the 
criterion for constitutionally acceptable state regulation under-
taken to protect the fetus, 60 the Court established a foundation 
for prohibiting those abortions most likely to result in live 
births. 61 But that analysis is merely a foundation: It only permits 
states to take such protective action; it does not require them to 
do so.62 In addition, under Roe and the Court's subsequent deci-
sions in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 62 (1976), and 
In all of these cases, one issue ~as whether plaintiff-parents had a cause of action in tort 
against medical personnel who were allegedly negligent in failing to inform them of a 
substantial risk that a particular pregnancy might result in the birth of a defective child, 
where the parents claimed that they would have elected to terminate the pregnancy had 
they possessed such information. See also Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 
F. Supp. 692 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (negligent genetic testing). Cf. Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 
379, 389 & n.8 (1979) (discerning possible conflict between time required to detect some 
genetic defects and the restriction of abortions where "sufficient reason to believe that the 
fetus may be viable"). 
59. See Delgado & Keyes, Parental Preferences and Selective Abortion: A Commen-
tary on Roe v. Wade, Doe v. Bolton, and the Shape of Things to Come, 1974 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 203; Note, State Protection of the Viable Unborn Child After Roe v. Wade: How 
Little, How Late, 37 LA. L. REV. 270, 280 (1976); Note, supra note 57, at 901-11. Cf. note 
57 supra (satisfaction of motivating interests). 
60. 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973). 
61. See Tribe, supra note 53, at 26-29. 
The Court's subsequent elaboration of the viability concept in Planned Parenthood 
v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976), is not to the contrary. There, in upholding a Missouri 
statutory definition of viability as "that stage of fetal development when the life of the 
unborn child may be continued indefinitely outside the womb by natural or artificial life-
supportive systems," 428 U.S. at 63, the Court emphasized that a determination of viabil-
ity "is, and must be, a matter for the judgment of the responsible attending physician," 
428 U.S. at 64, and observed that the Missouri definition actually allows greater freedom 
to those electing abortion than does the definition offered in Roe, 428 U.S. at 64. This 
latter point demonstrates the permissive, as distinguished from mandatory, nature of the 
timetable set forth in Roe. See 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973). See also Colautti v. Franklin, 
439 U.S. 379 (1979) (statutory requirement that person performing abortion must protect 
fetal life if, inter alia, sufficient reason to believe fetus may be viable is unconstitutionally 
vague). 
62. The Court stated: "For the stage subsequent to viability, the State in promoting 
its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even pro-
scribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the 
preservation of the life or health of the mother." 410 U.S. at 164-65 (emphasis added). 
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Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979), viability - the poten-
tial ability of the fetus to live outside the mother's womb, albeit 
with artificial aid63 - is a factual determination to be predicated 
not upon a universal or fixed point in gestation, but rather upon 
individualized, fetus-by-fetus assessments.64 
The difficulty of applying this rule to particular cases is illus-
trated by a recent opinion of a three-judge district court in South 
Carolina enjoining the criminal prosecution of a physician for 
illegal abortion and murder after he terminated an approximately 
twenty-five week pregnancy and the fetus, delivered alive, sur-
vived for twenty days, Floyd v. Anders, 440 F. Supp. 535 (D. S. 
C. 1977), vacated and remanded per curiam, 440 U.S. 445 (1979). 
The court apparently reasoned that, because the fetus could not 
survive outside the womb indefinitely, but only for twenty days, 
it was not viable; 65 thus, it held that the state could not prosecute 
the physician without violating the constitutional constraints of 
Roe and Planned Parenthood. 65 
Whether or not such reasoning is sound, 67 it highlights the 
difficulty of accurately assessing the viability of any individual 
fetus before the termination of a pregnancy (and hence the diffi-
culty of determining whether any particular abortion will be 
likely in fact to advance the cause of population control). 08 To 
suggest, as Judge Everett does, that New Gotham cannot en-
63. 410 U.S. at 160. 
64. See 410 U.S. at 160-61; Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 64 (1976); 
Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379,388 (1979); Floyd v. Anders, 440 F. Supp, 535,539 (D. 
S.C. 1977), vacated and remanded per curiam, 440 U.S. 445 (1979). 
65. 440 F. Supp. at 538. 
66. 440 F. Supp. at 538-39. 
67. By focusing on the actual life span of the fetus, once removed from the womb, 
rather than its potential ability to survive, the opinion implies that viability is a determi-
nation that can be made only after the termination of the pregnancy in question. See 440 
F. Supp. at 538. Roe v. Wade, however, defined a viable fetus as one "potentially able to 
live outside the mother's womb, albeit with artificial aid." 410 U.S. at 160. In a subsequent 
opinion, the Court explained that viability, so defined, nonetheless contemplates more 
than "momentary survival." Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 387 (1979). See also 
Anders v. Floyd, 440 U.S. 445 (1979) (per curiam), vacating and remanding 440 F. Supp. 
535 (D.S.C. 1977); Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302, 1316 (N.D. Ill.), appeal dismissed 
for want of jurisdiction sub nom. Carey v. Wynn, 439 U.S. 8 (1978), affd., 599 F.2d 193 
(7th Cir. 1979). 
68. Predicting the actual impact of any abortion upon population growth or control 
would appear to require even more difficult determinations than assessing viability. Pre-
sumably a fetus that lives for twenty days following abortion would have a de minimis 
effect on the size of New Gotham's population; such a fetus might, however, properly be 
classified as viable, according to the Supreme Court definition of that term in Roe, 410 
U.S. at 160, and notwithstanding the conclusion to the contrary reached in Floyd v. 
Anders, 440 F. Supp_. 535 (D.S.C. 1977), vacated and remanded per curiam, 440 U.S. 445 
(1979). See note 67 supra. 
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courage terminations of advanced pregnancies is•to ignore these 
vagaries inherent in the notion of viability. 69 And, to the extent 
that any abortion, whenever performed, increases the risk of 
death to the particular fetus in question,70 New Gotham's deci-
sion to encourage abortions throughout pregnancy rather than 
during a more limited period of gestation is consistent with the 
underlying goal of promoting population control to the fullest 
extent possible.71 That live births may result, even when the city 
successfully encourages indigent women to procure abortions, 
provides an additional reflection of the noncoercive and nonabso-
lute nature of the governmental action challenged here and of the 
minimal level of constitutional scrutiny against which we are to 
measure it.72 
None of these efforts to respond to Judge Everett's dissent, 
of course, need be read to say that the action pursued by New 
Gotham is wise or humane·, for we do not decide such cases on 
those grounds, see Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,479 (1977). Rather, 
whatever the apparent infirmities of the city's course, the 
abortion-funding cases, together with the additional support of 
other Supreme Court decisions, point ineluctably to its validity. 
69. See note 67 supra. See also Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 390-93 (1979). 
70. The method of abortion used becomes significant in this analysis. In Planned 
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 75-79 (1976), the Court discussed a number of 
different methods of abortion employed after the first trimester. One of those, saline 
amniocentesis, almost invariably causes fetal death while another, prostaglandin instilla-· 
tion, stimulates premature labor, more likely resulting in a live birth. See Colautti v. 
Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 399 (1979); Note, supra note 59, at 279-80. 
71. See note 51 supra. 
72. See note 50 supra and accompanying text. 
